I. Introduction
The future of the New International Economic Order depends to a great extent on the ability of less developed countries to follow in the steps of the OPEC countries and improve their terms of trade by cartelizing and increasing the prices of the basic commodities that they export. The argument has been made, however, that the success of OPEC is an exceptional phenomenon -that there is little potential for most LDC's to raise their export commodity prices through cartelization, either because substitutes for the commodities exist so that elasticities of demand are large, or because there are too many producing countries with differing interests to form a cohesive cartel. While this argument may be true for most commodities, it is probably not true for bauxite. In the two-year period January 1974 to January On the other hand, these magnitudes are quite significant to the alumina and aluminum producing industries, and are politically significant in that they raise the expectations of the other developing countries. Table 1 shows, for 1966 and 1975, bauxite production and proved reserves for various producing countries. Note that the greatest change has been in the position of Australia, which is now the largest producer of bauxite, holds the largest proved reserve base, and has the most rapidly growing production capacity. (Observe that the production of the U.S. and the other non-cartel countries has remained about constant; the U.S. now imports about 90% of its consumed-bauxite and alumina.) As Barnett [2 ] points out, there are indications that Australia may be a weak link in the cohesiveness of IBA. Australia has not increased its tax as have the other cartel members, and has thereby moved from 4 a position of competitive disadvantage (because of distance) to one of advantage.
Australia has recently been expanding its sales and relative share of the market at the expense of the Caribbean countries, which have had constant or declining sales, and declining market shares. And the squeeze on the Caribbean countries may become tighter as Brazil begins to develop its potential reserves of bauxite.
41974 transport costs to the USA ranged from $1.00 to $6.00 per metric ton for the Caribbean countries, but around $11.00 per metric ton for Australia. The tax levies of the Caribbean producers, however, have been considerably greater than these transport differentials. Source of data: Charles River Associates. about 200 years at current production levels, reserves would last only 55 years if production grows by 4% per year, so that depletion should be accounted for.
Dynamic adjustments of demand and supply must also be considered; bauxite supplies from non-cartel members can increase only slowly in response to price increases, so that a potential exists for large short-term gains to the cartel. Finally, any calculation of optimal cartel prices must account for the fact that the bauxite demand curve, while highly inelastic over a broad region, becomes almost infinitely elastic above a certain critical price level at which alternatives to bauxite become economical.
Answering the second question requires examining those factors that could lead to cartel instability. This includes differing production costs by different members, product heterogeneity across producers, and most important, the ability of one or more cartel members to earn higher revenues by undercutting the cartel price and expanding production. Australia is the one member of the cartel for whom these factors are most likely to apply. Although production costs are about the same, transport costs are larger, and since transport costs vary across consumers, this provides a means of undercutting. Also, since Australia has a rapidly growing capacity, it may be preferable for her to price and sell bauxite outside the cartel boundaries.
To provide some answers to both questions we extend the earlier work of this author 151 and calculate optimal cartel pricing policies using a simple optimal control model that captures the basic aspects of the pricing problem described above. These optimal policies are calculated for two alternative configurations of the cartel. First, we assume that Australia remains a member of the cartel, and produces a constant share of cartel output. Next, we assume that Australia leaves the cartel and produces bauxite as part of the competitive fringe of price takers. We can then determine the resulting change in the net present value of the flow of cartel profits, and the change in the net present value of the flow of profits to Australia. This tells us, first, to what extent it might be in Australia's interest to leave the cartel, and second, to what extent it is in the interest of the other cartel members to strike a bargain with Australia over some kind of output rationalization scheme.
The next two sections of this paper focus on the characteristics of the world bauxite market. First concentrating on bauxite demand, we will see that the characteristics of the bauxite demand function (in particular the critical price at which alternatives to bauxite become economical) depends highly on world energy prices. We then examine the characteristics of bauxite production and reserves for the major producing countries. In Section 4 we specify a dynamic cartel pricing model, and use it to obtain optimal pricing policies under two alternative assumptions -first that Australia is part of the cartel, and second that Australia is part of the competitive fringe. We also specify and solve a static equilibrium model in which Australia is part of the fringe, but has an infinitely elastic supply, and must adjust that supply optimally
given the price reaction function of the cartel. These models will help us to determine whether it is in Australia's interest to leave the cartel, and how leaving the cartel might affect the price of bauxite.
The Demand for Bauxite
Up to some critical price, the demand curve for bauxite is highly inelastic, and this is one reason why a cartel like IBA has the potential to enjoy large monopoly profits. At a bauxite price of $10.00 per ton, bauxite itself represents about 8 of the cost of producing aluminum, and if the price of bauxite doubles to $20.00 per ton, its share in aluminum production costs would only 5 rise to 12%. It is unlikely that the short-run and long-run price elasticities of aluminum demand are greater in magnitude than -0.2 and -1.0 respectively. 6 Thus reasonable estimates for the short-and long-run price elasticities of bauxite deumad would be-around "-Q16 and -.08 respeetrely. -Asasiofg-tiat at
The cost of alumina represents about 30% of the cost of producing aluminum. At a $10.00 bauxite price, and using the Bayer process, bauxite represents about 26% of the cost of producing alumina (see Table 4 ). At a bauxite price of $20.00, bauxite represents 40% of the cost of producing alumina. In fact only about 88% of bauxite and alumina consumed in the U.S. is used to to produce aluminum. About 6% is used in the production of chemicals, 4% in refractories and 2% in abrasives. Accounting for this, hever, would not change our elasticity estimates significantly.
I have seen no econometric estimates of the elasticities of demand for aluminum. One would expect, however, these elasticities to be roughly comparable to those for copper demand. Fisher, Cootner, and Bailey [5] estimate the longrun elasticity of copper demand to be around -0.8, and Banks [1] estimates it to be -1.0. current production levels, the production of aluminum from alumina and the production of alumina from bauxite both face roughly constant returns to scale, the income elasticities for bauxite should be about the same as that for aluminum. A reasonable estimate for the long-run income elasticity of aluminum demand would be 1.0.
For purposes of analysis, we therefore take the short-run and long-run income elasticities of bauxite demand to be 0.2 and 1.0 respectively.
Should the price of bauxite rise above a certain level, it would become more economical to produce alumina from sources other than bauxite, so that the demand for bauxite would become almost infinitely elastic.
Clearly this critical price is a crucial determinant of the ability of a bauxite cartel to raise prices beyond their current levels, and it is therefore worthwile estimating this price as accurately as possible.
Alumina (A1 2 0 3 ) can also be produced from high-alumina clays, dawsonite, alunite, and anorthosite, all of which are in great abundance in the earth's crust. Recently the U.S. Bureau of Mines estimated the fixed capital costs and annual operating costs of producing alumina from high-alumina clay, from anorthosite, and from bauxite [17] . There are some 18 alternative processes by which alumina can be produced from clay, but the most economical (over a fairly wide range of factor input costs) is the hydrochloric acid-ion exchange 7 Again, no econometric estimates are available. If we use estimated income elasticities for copper, 1.0 would be appropriate. 8 Although there appears to be very little easily recoverable bauxite in the U.S., there are large amounts of high-alumina clays, dawsonite, alunite, and anorthosite. It is estimated, for example, that up to ten billion tons of high-grade clay (25% to 35% alumina) could be available in Arkansas, Georgia, and elsewhere in the U.S., and that one or two billion tons each of alunite (37% alumina) could be available in Utah and Colorado, and large deposits of anorthosite have been found in California, Wyoming New York, and other states. For more detail, see Patterson [13] and Patterson and Dyni [14] .
process.9 There is only one economical process for producing alumina from anorthosite, and that is the lime-soda sinter process, and although this is a less economical way to produce alumina (given recent prices of clay and anorthosite), it is close enough in cost to make it worth considering. The standard process by which alumina is produced from bauxite is the Bayer process.
The Bureau of Mines estimates are based on 1973 prices for factor inputs, and I have updated these estimates to properly reflect 1976 prices.1
This updating has turned out to be critical, since the production of alumina from clay and anorthosite is much more energy-intensive than its production from bauxite, and energy prices have risen considerably in the last three 11 years.
This has greatly increased the critical price at which bauxite is no longer economical. 1 2 Annual operating costs for producing alumina from clay using the hydro-13 chloric acid-ion exchange process are shown in Table 2 . Note that the 9 Other clay-based processes that come close in cost are the nitric acid-ion process exthange and the hydrochloric acid-isopropyl etherreztz-etion process.
1.
10My earlier study [15] is based on the 1973 data.
Given a particular process for producing alumina, the energy requirements per ton of alumina rise hyperbolically as the grade of the ore (percentage content of alumina) decreases. Clay and anorthosite have, on an average. much lower alumina content than bauxite. In addition, because of the particular technologies that are available to extract alumina, for any given ore grade, use of anorthosite is more energy-intensive than use of clay, which in turn is more energy-.intensive than use of bauxite. See Page and
Creasey [12] .
largest single factor cost is for natural gas, the wholesale industrial price of which has more than doubled since 1973. The costs for producing alumina from anorthosite using the lime-soda sinter process are shown in Table 3 .
This process uses even more natural gas per ton of alumina, and is slightly more costly than the hydrochloric acid-ion exchange process. The difference is small enough, however, so that changes in the prices of raw materials could make it preferable. Finally, the costs for producing alumina from bauxite using the Bayer process are shown in Table 4 . Note that total operating costs are given as a function of the price of bauxite.
From Tables 2 and 4 we can easily compute the cross-over price at which clay becomes a more economical source of alumina than bauxite. That price is simply the solution to the equation 76.46 + 2.582P = 139.11 (1) or P = $24.26 per short ton ($26.73 per metric ton). These calculations, however, are based on plants operating in the United States where natural gas prices (and energy prices in general) have been held below world market levels. It is quite possible that through deregulation natural gas prices in the U.S. will increase significantly in the near future, and this will change the cross-over price. It is reasonable to assume a further doubling of the wholesale industrial price of natural gas to $2.20 per MMBtu (putting the price abbut equal to the world market price of oil on a Btu equivalent basis). It is also reasonable to assume that should this happen the cost of steam (used in the Bayer process) would increase by 502 as well. 1 7 In this case the cross-over price is the solution to equation 
where TD is total demand in millions of metric tons, and P is the critical price 17I am assuming here that natural gas currently provides about half of the boiler fuel used to generate steam. I have not, however, been able to check this assumption.
at which alternatives to bauxite become economical. We will analyze the effects of energy prices on potential bauxite cartel behavior by using two alternative values for P, $26.73 and $39.19 (both per metric ton). By attaching a large enough exponent to the term (Pt/P), we can achieve an arbitrarily close approximation to a piecewise linear demand function. In fact we would expect demand to start falling off at prices somewhere below the critical price P (if for no other reason than in anticipation of future price increases), and demand to be small but not zero at higher prices, so we choose 10 as the exponent. Long-run bauxite demand functions for the two alternative values of P are plotted in Figure 1 .
Z_, Bauxite Production and Reserves
The ability of IBA to increase its profits as it raises price depends partly on the supply response of non-IBA countries, and, should it decide to leave the cartel, Australia's ability to increase its output over time in response to price increases. Unfortunately the determinants of bauxite supply are complicdated and difficult to describe in the context of a simple model.
Some bauxite producers are parts of the major vertically integrated aluminum companies, the number of producers in each country varies across countries, and changes in supply are brought about by other factors besides changes in price. The potential (and proved) reserves of bauxite in the major producing countries are large, so that conceivably any amount of bauxite could be produced, given the time required to increase capacity.
Looking at the pattern of bauxite production in different countries over the last decade or so affirms that there is no simple supply function that can be easily identified. Production levels for a number of countries are shown for the last 15 years in Table 5 . Bauxite prices remained roughly constant from 1960 to 1971 (and were probably close to average production costs plus average amortized exploration costs). During that time there was little change in U.S. production, production in France increased by about 50X, production in Guyana, Surinam and Jamaica about doubled, but production in Australia increased from zero to about 14 million metric tons per year. Since 1971, and in particular over the last two years, bauxite ptices have doubled or tripled. Production in the U.S., France, Jamaica and Surinam remained constant or declined slightly, production in Guyana declined by about 35%, while production in Australia increased by another 40% between 1972 and 1975. There is no overall pattern of supply response to price changes that can be discerned here.
Bauxite production costs also vary to a considerable extent across countries, although 1976 average production costs are fairly uniform at around $6 to $7 per metric ton for those IBA countries with large proved reserves. Given the regional variation in production costs, reserves (see Table 1 ), current and planned -capacity, and transportation costs, it seems clear that 1 9 Figures obtained from conversations with World Bank officials. rough terms the potential behavior of IBA, we must make some assumptions about average production costs and aggregate supply elasticities. Average 1976 production costs for IBA could reasonbly be taken to be about $7.00 per metric ton, although we must recognize that these costs will increase slowly over the years as higher grade reserves are depleted. We aggregate non-IBA countries together and view them as competitive price takers with a long-run supply of elasticity of 2. This elasticity may seem large given some of the figures in Table 5 , but we assume a ten-year mean adjustment between the shortand long-run.
We must also account for reserve depletion in both IBA and non-IBA countries.
1975 IBA reserves were about 12,400 million metric tons; we assume that IBA production costs rise hyperbolically from $7 per ton as these reserves are depleted, i.e., IBA costs are given by 86,800/R t , where Rt is reserves in mt.
Averaging over all countries, reserves are about 200 times current production levels.
As these reserves are used up, new ones will be found, but at higher cost, so that the supply curve for the competitive fringe will move to the left over time.
We assume that after all current reserves are depleted, supply would be about 35% of its current level, given the current price.
Our assumptions about supply elasticities and the shift in supply as reserves are depleted lead to the following supply function for the non-IBA producers:
St (-1.1 + .1467t)(1.005)-CSt/11 + .90S_ 1 (4) where CS is cumulative supply (zero in 1975), and the initial supply level is 11 nmt/yr. At a price of $15 the long-run supply elasticity is then 2.0.
4.
Potential Pricin& Policies for IBA.
We can now lay out two versions of a simple aggregate model of the world bauxite market, and use them to examine potential cartel pricing policies.
In the first version Australia remains part of IBA:
The equations for total demand (TD) and competitive supply (S) were discussed above, CS is cumulative competitive supply, D is the net demand for IBA bauxite, R is IBA reserves, and W is the sum of discounted profits. Quantities are in millions of metric tons, and prices in 1976 dollars per metric ton. We solve this model (i.e. determine the price trajectory that maximizes W) using a general nonlinear optimal control algorithm developed by Hnyilicza [7] . Initial The solutions to both versions of the model are given in Table 6 , and the optimal price trajectories and profits to Australia are shown graphically in Figures 2 and 3 . The initial decline in prices reflects the ability of the cartel to enjoy large short-run profits by taking advantage of the lags in the response of total demand and competitive supply to higher prices. In both cases prices gradually approach the limit price ($26.76) at which alternatives to bauxite become economical. Comparing the price trajectories for the two versions of the model, we see that prices are lower for about the first 25 years, but later higher, when Asutralia is part of the competitive fringe. If the fringe becomes larger at the expense of the cartel, the optimal price trajectory would become closer to ;-at would prevail in a competitive market, and for an exhaustible resource the monopoly price is initially higher, and later lower, than the competitive price.
It is not clear from these results whether it would pay for Australia to leave the cartel. Australia's sum of discounted profits for the first 20 years is larger if it leaves the cartel, but over 50 years it is smaller, and over A key question here is the extent to which Australia can increase its output without incurring large increases in marginal and average cost. We assumed above that as part of the fringe Australia would have the same long-run supply elasticity (2.0) as the other competitive producers. It is likely, however, that Australia's supply is much more elastic than that of other countries.
It would be reasonable, in fact, to assume that Australia's supply is infinitely elastic, and that it can produce almost any amount of bauxite at a constant average cost of $7 per ton.
This assumption leads to a quite different model of the bauxite market.
As part of the fringe, Australia would be a price taker as before (IBA would still set price to maximize its profts), but would determine its quantitygiven the expected price reaction of the cartel -to maximize its own profits.
We have in effect a Stackelberg model of market behavior, and we can solve this model if it is expressed as a static long-run equilibrium approximation to the model of equations (5)- (10). 
A22istralia makes larger profits during the first two years as part of IBA since as part of the fringe its awn supply can adjust only slowly in response to price increases. In the next twenty years its profits are lower as part of IBA since net cartel demand is reduced as the fringe expands its output.
Higher output as part of the finge during the first twenty years, however, means lower output later as reserves are depleted.
and the supply function of the competitive ftinge, excluding Australia, as S -11.0 + 1.467P (12) Denoting Australia's output by Qa, the net demand to the cartel is then D = TD -S - (13) We assume that the cartel adjusts price in response to Australia's output, which it takes as given:
Cartel:
Substituting (11) and (12) into (14), we have the following approximate reacion unc n fr the cartel: 23 action function for the cartel: P = 28.06 -.28 Qa (15) We now assume that Australia chooses its profit-maximizing output given this reaction function:
Australia:
Max Ia = (28.06 -.28Qa -7)Qa aa a (16) This implies Qa = 37.6 mmt/yr and P $17.53. 2 3 The exact reaction function is found by solving the following equation However, for prices less than $20 (Qa greater than 28 mmt/yr), equation (15) is correct to within 2% of the true price.
In Table 7 we summarize the 1980 equilibrium bauxite prices, undiscounted profits, demand and supply implied by the three alternative sets of assumptions analyzed above. Cases 1 and 2 correspond to the dynamic optimal pricing model, first with Australia in IBA, and then with Australia in the finge, with a long-run supply elasticity of 2.0. Case 3 corresponds to the static model where Australia is in the fringe, but has an infinite long-run supply elasticity.
Note that Australia's profits in Cases 1 and 2 are nearly the same, but are considerably increased in Case 3. Comparing Case 3 with Case 1, we see that if
Australia can increase production with no increase in average cost, it can almost double its profits by more than doubling its output. Profits to the other cartel members fall by more than half, but it is still optimal for the cartel members to maintain a price that is only about $4 lower. Our calculations of optimal prices were based on certain assumptions about energy prices. We have seen that an increase in energy prices (in particular the price of natural gas) would result in an extension of the inelastic region of the total demand function for bauiite, and this could considerably increase the optimal cartel price.(whether or not Australia is a member.of the cartel).
A doubling of the wholesale price of natural gas, for example, would probably 24 Nash bargaining theory provides a framework for determining relative bargaining power and a likely division of output. For an application of this theory o the analysis of the OPEC oil cartel, see Hnyilicza and Pindyck [8] . 
